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Abstract
Background: Incentives are central to economics and are used across the public and private sectors to influence
behavior. Recent interest has been shown in using financial incentives to promote desirable health behaviors and
discourage unhealthy ones.
Main text: If we are going to use incentive schemes to influence health behaviors, then it is important that we
give them the best chance of working. Behavioral economics integrates insights from psychology with the laws of
economics and provides a number of robust psychological phenomena that help to better explain human behavior.
Individuals’ decisions in relation to incentives may be shaped by more subtle features – such as loss aversion,
overweighting of small probabilities, hyperbolic discounting, increasing payoffs, reference points – many of which
have been identified through research in behavioral economics. If incentives are shown to be a useful strategy to
influence health behavior, a wider discussion will need to be had about the ethical dimensions of incentives before
their wider implementation in different health programmes.
Conclusions: Policy makers across the world are increasingly taking note of lessons from behavioral economics and
this paper explores how key principles could help public health practitioners design effective interventions both in
relation to incentive designs and more widely.
Keywords: Behavior change, Healthcare, Incentives, Behavioral economics, Nudge
Background
The effect of individual behavior on health outcomes is
considerable with estimates that up to 40% of premature
deaths in the developed world are attributable to
unhealthy behaviors, such as smoking, poor diet and
sedentary lifestyle [1]. Reducing morbidity and mortality
losses in the future is likely to depend as much on mo-
tivating changes in behavior as on developing new treat-
ments or technologies and many countries and health
systems are now directing resources to this end [2, 3].
A range of tools are at the disposal of policy makers
seeking to influence behavior including legislation, price
signals (taxes and subsidies) and information campaigns.
Although the use of incentives in wider public policy is
nothing new, their role in encouraging health behaviors
is a relatively recent phenomenon [4]. Incentives can
take a number of forms including cash or alternatively
vouchers that can then be exchanged for desirable items.
The apparent enthusiasm for using incentives to influence
health behaviors has come about as the full economic and
social costs of unhealthy behaviors have become apparent
and with the finding that health behaviors can be signifi-
cantly affected by the structure of economic incentives
that individuals face [5, 6]. Examples of incentive schemes
recently implemented in the United Kingdom include the
‘Give It Up For Baby’ programme in Tayside, Scotland to
encourage pregnant smokers to quit the habit and the
‘Pounds for Pounds’ scheme in Kent, England to influence
weight control [7]. In diabetes care, incentive programs
directed at patients show promise as a means to influence
patient behavior and intermediate outcomes such as
weight loss [8].
But widespread concerns do exist and tend to center
on the potentially coercive impact of using incentives
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and the ‘unfairness’ of rewarding people for doing things
that are already in their own interest [9, 10]. We share
some of those reservations, but rather than adding fur-
ther to this normative debate, we will focus herein on
positive ways in which we might give incentives the best
opportunity to work if and when they are considered
appropriate.
We will look to see whether it is possible to provide
further guidance on how best to configure and imple-
ment incentive schemes using evidence from behavioral
economics. Behavioral economics has come to promin-
ence following the publication of Richard Thaler and
Cass Sunstein’s book Nudge [11], but the science under-
lying it is built on decades of applied research by the
likes of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky [12, 13]. In
contrast to economic models of rational choice suggest-
ing that we respond to information and price signals,
insights from across the behavioral sciences suggest that
human behavior is actually influenced greatly by the
context or environment within which many of our deci-
sions are taken. Nowadays ‘dual process’ theories can be
found in social, personality, cognitive, clinical and health
psychology [14]. Two general paradigms for behavior
change have emerged over the years. The first type aims
to change high-order cognitions such as beliefs and atti-
tudes as a route to influencing deliberate responses by
using persuasion and education campaigns. The second
approach aims to influence lower-order mental processes,
thus triggering spontaneous responses, by changing the
context or environment within which the person acts
without necessarily changing underlying higher-order cog-
nitions such as beliefs and attitudes. In other words, the
distinction is between behaviors resulting from internally
cued, reflective, and intentional changes versus behaviors
resulting from externally cued, automatic and (often sub-
conscious) reactive changes [15].
Governments around the world are taking notice of
the potential role behavioral economics could play in
designing more effective public policy. A prominent
example is the coalition Government in the United
Kingdom, who have so far made recommendations on
how public behavior around charitable giving and prevent-
ive health could be influenced using the Mindspace frame-
work for behavior change [16–19]. Intelligent design of
incentive schemes is one of the key tools in this new
‘behavioral’ approach.
Financial incentives in healthcare
It is well established that a higher price reduces con-
sumption [20]. So, we see that smoking consumption in
Europe has been seen to decrease by about 5% for every
10% increase in the real price of cigarettes and that in-
creasing the price of alcohol is among the most effective
options for reducing consumption [21, 22]. Price signals
to influence behavior in healthcare can take forms be-
sides traditional ‘sin taxes’ for example by subsidising
healthy behaviors or rewarding adherence to a treatment
programme. The increase in the last decade of schemes
aimed at changing the health-related behavior of the
public has been accompanied by evidence that even
small incentives can positively influence choices [23–25].
Having said that, a recent review of the evidence for the
effects of economic instruments (prices or income) on
dietary and physical activity behaviors and corollary out-
comes [26] revealed that evidence is limited in terms of
the potential for causal inference and yields ambiguous
or inconsistent findings (the evidence is also mostly
about impacts on diet, with very limited evidence for im-
pacts on physical activity). Those findings highlight the
need to implement robustly designed interventions and
evaluations of the logic models and programme theories
involved.
In clinical psychology, the contextual-change route has
taken a substantial share of research, because classical
behavior therapy and cognitive-behavioral therapy focus
on underlying learning processes and environmental
contingencies of reinforcement [27, 28]. Schedules of
contingent reinforcement are also a key to the success of
rewards (materialised incentives) and often used in behav-
ioral psychology circles. For example, providing contingent
rewards is used in interventions developing constructive
habits. This reinforcement principle has been successfully
employed to treat drug addiction and substance misuse (in-
cluding smoking and alcohol consumption) and to improve
medication compliance [29]. Such interventions usually in-
clude earning money or points contingent on the patients’
specific behaviors.
The effectiveness and long-term sustainability of be-
havioral change when incentives are targeted at the more
challenging and complex behaviors such as smoking and
obesity is less well known [30–33]. Also, given the op-
portunity costs of the changed behavior is the same
across income groups, we may also expect to see that as
£1 to a poor person is worth more than £1 to a rich per-
son, small incentives are also likely to be more effective
in low-income groups [34].
A review from behavioral economics
We identified interesting examples from the literature
through a search strategy of electronic databases includ-
ing (PubMed, EMBASE, PsychInfo) using keywords. We
reviewed Longitudinal, cross-sectional and retrospective
studies of interventions using incentives to change health
behaviors, including patients and/or providers of health-
care. We also included systematic reviews of such inter-
ventions. Our team independently reviewed articles and
compared and discussed interpretations. Results were
synthesized under thematic classification and abstraction.
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Because this is a debate article, we have not provided a re-
view of all those studies. We do no aim to synthesize the
evidence. Rather, in our manuscript we offer a theoretical
investigation of incentive design and behavior change.
Although success has been seen with a number of finan-
cial incentive schemes targeting preventive health behav-
iors, some financial incentives have not worked at all well,
or even at all in the case of reducing levels of obesity [33].
It may be that incentives are unlikely to work at a cost-
effective level in changing certain complex behaviors. An-
other contributing factor could be that too little thought
has been put into the design of incentive schemes previ-
ously implemented. Roland Fryer has demonstrated how
important design is when thinking about how financial in-
centives can be used to improve educational achievement
[35]. In a series of school based randomized trials, incen-
tives were only found to be effective when they were given
for inputs to the educational production function. Incen-
tives tied to educational outputs were not effective. Quali-
tative data suggested that because students do not
understand the education production function, they were
not able to ‘turn their excitement about rewards’ into
meaningful achievement. The same may be true for
people offered incentives to lose weight or stop smoking.
Those choosing the format of incentive schemes will
have many options available to them when thinking
about design. Let us take a theoretical example of an in-
centive scheme to encourage participation in a weight-
loss programme. The reward may be given for attending
classes and it could be given at the beginning of the
programme, at its completion or in increasing or decreasing
increments as classes are attended. Alternatively, the incen-
tive could be given dependent on actual weight loss targets
that result from following the programme. Different
scheme designs are likely to lead to different outcomes.
It is important to think about the most effective design
of incentive schemes, as our responses can be shaped by
a range of predictable biases and heuristics [12, 13, 36].
Behavioral economics provides us with a number of
robust psychological phenomena that help explain the
decisions we make in a range of settings, including sav-
ings, health and education [15, 19]. Evidence suggests
that human behavior is led by our very human and fal-
lible brain and the context or environment in which
many of our choices are taken. The finding being that
small changes in context (nudges) can affect behavior as
much as large price changes [11, 37]. Such effects or
‘nudges’ can be applied to the design of more effective
incentive schemes and include the following.
Losses loom larger than gains
It has been demonstrated that we react more to losses
than to gains of equivalent magnitude [38], which is em-
bedded into the well-known (Nobel prize winning)
Prospect Theory of risky choice. Loss aversion implies
that someone who loses £10 from his or her pocket will
lose more satisfaction than another person would gain
satisfaction from a £10 windfall. Most incentive schemes
tend to offer rewards to participants but inducing some
feeling of loss if they fail to do something may be more
motivating than rewarding them by the same amount.
So, instead of providing a £10 reward for each of the ten
sessions of a weight loss programme, it may be more ef-
fective to provide £100 at the end of the programme,
with all missed sessions attracting a more salient and
painful £10 loss. Using a behavioral economics framework,
one randomised study has shown the short-term effective-
ness of such a scheme. Individuals in this programme con-
tributed to a matched deposit contract that rewarded
them if they met or exceeded their weight loss goal but
led to the loss of the reward if they failed [39]. Loss aver-
sion is one of the most robust phenomenon from behav-
ioral economics and could be used more widely across
incentive schemes.
An interesting intervention tested the impact of financial
incentives framed as a gain or loss to promote Chlamydia
screening in students, mimicking the standard outreach
approach to student in halls of residence [40]. This was a in
a cluster randomized trial (N = 1060; age 18–24 years). The
students were offered (depending on condition) £5 voucher
vs. £200 lottery. In the control group the screening rate was
1.5%, while the lottery increased screening to 2.8% and the
voucher increased screening to 22.8%. Incentives framed as
gains were more effective than loss-framed incentives
(10.5% vs. 7.1%, respectively). This work contributes to
the literature by testing the predictive validity of Pro-
spect Theory to change health behavior in the field.
In another domain, such a framing manipulation was
used to increase factory worker productivity in a field
experiment [41]. They find conditional incentives framed
as both “losses” and “gains” increase productivity for
both individuals and teams. In addition, teams more
acutely respond to bonuses posed as losses than as compar-
able bonuses posed as gains. The total team productivity is
enhanced by 1% purely due to the framing manipulation.
Another interesting intervention tested the power of loss
aversion to improve teacher performance [42]. During the
2010–11 Chicago school year teachers were randomly
asked to participate in a pay-for-performance program with
“gain” and “loss” treatments. The “gain” group received
traditional financial incentives at the end of the year in the
form of bonuses linked to student achievement. Those
teachers in the “loss” group were paid a lump-sum in ad-
vance and asked to give back the money if their students
did not meet performance targets. Teachers in both condi-
tions received the same monetary bonus if they reached the
same performance targets. This approach resulted in in-
creases in math test scores for the loss condition by an
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equivalent of increasing teacher quality by more than one
standard deviation. The gain treatment yields smaller and
statistically insignificant results. The authors attribute the
significant difference between the loss and gain condition
to the loss aversion framing. Those intervention techniques
could be used to improve the productivity of the healthcare
workforce too.
Overweighting of small probabilities
There is good evidence that people place more weight
on small probabilities than standard economic theory
would suggest [43], which is another essential element
of Prospect Theory. This helps explain the widespread
popularity of lotteries and insurance. Although the ten-
dency to overweight the probability of unlikely but sali-
ent outcomes can lead to problem gambling [44], it can
also be used to positive effect using lottery based public
policy interventions. Lottery based financial incentive
programs have been seen to be effective in a weight loss
intervention and in improving warfarin adherence and
anticoagulation control [45].
Patel et al. [46] tested the effect of different types of
lottery-based financial incentives in increasing physical
activity among University of Pennsylvania Employees
with body mass index ≥27. All participants used smart-
phones to track their steps per day and received daily
feedback on performance for 26 weeks (financial incen-
tive for 13 weeks and then were follow up for 13 weeks
without incentives). Daily lottery incentives were de-
signed as a “higher frequency, smaller reward” (1 in 4
chance of winning $5), “jackpot” (1 in 400 chance of
winning $500), or “combined lottery” (18% chance of $5
and 1% chance of $50). The outcome measure was the
mean proportion of participants who achieved the daily
goal of 7000 steps. During the intervention, only the
combined lottery incentives was significantly greater
than control (0.38 vs. 0.26 mean proportion of partici-
pant days that goal was achieved); and there were no sig-
nificant differences during follow-up. This study shows
that interventions need to experiment with designing
different types of lottery schemes.
Living for today at the expense of tomorrow
The third phenomenon is hyperbolic discounting also
known as ‘present bias’ [47, 48]. Economists assume that
our preferences over today versus tomorrow are the
same as those over this time next week and this time in
eight days. Although standard discounting simply says
that we use the same discount rate in each period, evi-
dence tells us that today looms much larger so that we
discount very heavily from the present and less heavily
once we think about any time into the future. So given
the option, some people would choose to take £18 today
rather than £20 tomorrow but would be much less
inclined to take the £18 in a week’s time than £20 a day
later. It has been demonstrated that the immediacy of an
incentive can influence outcome of voucher-based incen-
tive programmes for substance misuse [29], and an under-
standing of hyperbolic discounting should lead those
designing schemes to think more carefully about when the
actual incentive is given.
The immediacy of financial incentives also show po-
tential for supporting smoking cessation in pregnancy. A
review of evidence found that providing vouchers con-
tingent on testing for smoking were effective in reducing
smoking rates in late pregnancy, compared to vouchers
without testing [49]. Specifically, linking the incentive to
the desired outcome was clearly an important feature of
the incentive design.
Similarly, an immediate financial incentive has been
shown to improve adherence to anti-psychotic medica-
tions [50]. This trial offered a £15 incentive to one group
of patients for each medication taken, whilst a second
group received usual care. The majority of patients and
clinicians felt positive about the use of incentives, and
the costs were relatively low. Patients receiving the in-
centive were more likely to take the medication (85% vs
71%). When the incentives stopped, adherence returned
to the same level as those who had not received the
incentives.
Increasing rather than decreasing payoffs
Incentives have generally been seen to be more effective
for one off behaviors like vaccinations [25]. An under-
standing of hyperbolic discounting is particularly useful
for incentive schemes where only a one-off reward is
offered. For complex behaviors, multiple incentives may
need to be offered at intervals but how should they be
given? It has been seen that people respond more to in-
creasing payoffs, as opposed to decreasing or constant
ones [51]. This principle has been used to develop suc-
cessful interventions to treat drug addiction and sub-
stance misuse and to improve medication compliance
[29]. In those interventions, the patients earn points
contingent on submitting urine specimens that are drug-
negative or substance-negative. The reward points (in-
centive) usually begin at a low value and increase with
each successive negative test result. If the patient fails to
provide a scheduled specimen or provides a drug-positive
result, then the voucher’s value is reset back to the initial
low value from which it could begin to increase again.
Such incentive contingency scheme can be used to im-
prove outcomes across a wide range of different behaviors
and populations.
Reference points matter
A study from the developing world provides a further
phenomenon which is that reference points matter when
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offering incentives. Evidence from the field, suggests that
people care more about what they gain or lose around
what they already have rather than what they may end
up with. It is known that many people tested for human
immunodeficiency viruses (HIV) in the developing world
do not pick up their results. This is a major challenge to
prevention campaigns and has led to a variety of ‘know
your status’ campaigns. A programme in Malawi has
shown that offering incentives can encourage people to
pick up their HIV result [52]. The biggest increase in up-
take, by around 50%, is observed when the incentive chan-
ged from zero and one-tenth of a day’s wage. Offering
more money still positively affects behavior but to a much
lesser degree. This finding is consistent with a ‘concave’
utility function in economics known as ‘diminishing mar-
ginal utility of income’ (more income impacts us less), but
the rate at which utility declines when income rises would
have to be extremely steep which is not what traditional
economic models would predict. The results suggest that
the utility of money is judged relative to reference points
that are very contextually and narrowly defined. This find-
ing also suggests that such locally defined reference points
could influence decisions around price and the cost-
effectiveness of offered incentives.
Ethical concerns
Motivating behavior change in health is much more
complex than can be accomplished with a single strategy
and offering incentives (both positive and negative) are
just one route to achieving improvements in health out-
comes. Financial incentives are increasingly seen as an
important vehicle to bring about changes in behavior
that lead to healthier lifestyles and supporters and critics
alike can be passionate about their use. Supporters of in-
centive schemes generally believe that people should be
encouraged where possible into behaviors that promote
improved health outcomes and that appropriately tar-
geted incentives can reduce inequalities in health out-
comes [4, 25, 53]. Incentive programmes can be seen as
an example of symmetric or libertarian paternalism that
steer people towards better choices without limiting
what those choices are [54]. But there are also legitimate
ethical concerns. Monetary compensation has the poten-
tial to lead to intrinsic motivation being ‘crowded out’ or
partially destroyed [55], so that when an activity is asso-
ciated with an external reward, a person may be less in-
clined to do the activity in the future without further
rewards. However, this concern is related to the efficacy
of incentives rather than the ethics. More concern
comes from the perception that incentives can be seen
as a form of bribery and/or coercion and inconsistent
with shred social values [56].
Marteau et al. [9] suggest a psychological perspective
that can help us think about the appropriateness of
using incentives for encouraging participation screening
tests. It is known that individuals do not always act ac-
cording to their long-term goals and interests. We also
know that in hindsight people often would prefer to have
acted differently. For example, most of us would like to
eat more healthy food, drink less, and stop smoking. Still,
our behaviours do not match such intentions. Offering
people a reward/incentive helps them to align their ac-
tions with such preferences. In this way, incentives en-
hance their autonomy to act according to their true
underlying preferences. This may help explain why gov-
ernments and private organisations increasingly apply
financial incentives, or other extrinsic motivations, to im-
prove health [57]. There is also evidence that the public
supports incentive schemes that are cost-effective [58, 59].
Consequently, alongside further exploration of the ap-
propriateness of using incentives in health we also need
to determine whether or not they work and are cost-
effective. At present we do not know what impact differ-
ent incentive schemes have on various health behaviors
or what impact they may have on different socioeco-
nomic groups invited for appointments. If we learn that
incentives are unsuccessful and/or are not cost-effective
then more broadly implementing these interventions
would be considered unwise and would not be advised.
Researchers have explored the use of such incentive
schemes in a range of settings, and with different popu-
lations. The results have varied, suggesting that incen-
tives are context-dependent, and need to be planned
carefully according to the needs and preferences of dif-
ferent groups. For example, offering small financial in-
centives – such as £10 in cash, or the opportunity to
win £1000 in a lottery – did not improve attendance at
eye screening for people with diabetes [60]. This study
recruited people who had not attended their eye screen-
ing appointment in the last two years. Patients in the
two incentive groups were actually less likely to attend
their appointments than those who received the stand-
ard invitation. The reasons for this unexpected result
were not clear, but all the patients involved were from
relatively deprived groups with a history of non-attendance.
The researchers also suggested that the offer of an incentive
may cause a negative reaction, if the recipient believes that
the screening must be unpleasant if they have to be paid to
do it. This is supported by the finding that the lottery offer
– to win a much larger sum – was associated with the low-
est levels of attendance.
Given the promise of incentives to positively motivate
behavior, we should not necessarily use legitimate con-
cerns about their wider use in public policy prevent us
from studying them in earnest. This article seeks to do
this while recognising the concerns about their use. If
incentives are shown to be a useful strategy to influence
health behavior, a wider discussion will need to be had
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about the ethical dimensions of incentives before their
wider implementation in different health programmes.
Conclusions
Financial incentives are increasingly seen as an import-
ant vehicle by which to bring about changes in behavior
that can lead to healthier lifestyles. Limited evidence also
suggests that appropriately targeted incentives could re-
duce inequalities in health outcomes [53, 61]. There are
lessons that can be learned from a range of disciplines
and we have focused on those from behavioral econom-
ics in this article.
Policy implications
We cannot give specific advice to policy makers for all
individual circumstances, but there are some clear exam-
ples of policy and program applications of the general
ideas presented in this article.
Financial incentives have been seen to be more effective
in increasing performance of infrequent behaviors (e.g.
vaccinations, screening) rather than in more sustained
behaviors (e.g. smoking, dieting) [62]. Therefore, the
incentives-related lessons from behavioral economics
should be more readily applied to infrequent behaviors in
the first instance. In relation to ‘overweighting small prob-
abilities’, for example, policy makers and program designers
could set up vaccinations incentive programs as lotteries,
that is, ‘if you vaccinate your child, we will enter your name
into a lottery, and you just might win a lot of money’.
Financial incentives for healthy behavior are already
being used by large employers or health insurance pro-
viders [63, 64]. For example, patients in some states in
USA have some benefits reduced or eliminated if they
do not participate in health care screenings, keep their
medical appointments, take their medications and ad-
here to health improvement programs as directed by
their health care providers [65].
The United States administration also issued a rule
that employers can use financial rewards and penalties
for workers worth up to 50% of the health insurance
premium as an incentive to quit smoking, exercise, eat
healthier food, lose weight, and lower cholesterol and
blood pressure [66]. In particular, the rule allows, as part
employee wellness programs, employers to reward or
penalize employees who meet specific standards related
to their health (e.g., rewarding employees who do not
use tobacco or who achieve a specific cholesterol level,
weight or body mass index). In order to avoid wasting
public resources, such programs will provide evidence
how such incentives schemes work in the longer-term
and which method is most cost-effective. Employers can
improve the effectiveness of such programs by incorpor-
ating the behavioral economics principles discussed in
this article.
Evidently, incentive programs directed at both providers
and patients have become increasingly widespread. Al-
though we have focused on patients and the public in this
article, incentives are also frequently used to target pro-
vider behavior as a means to improve quality of care [67].
For example, in 2004 in the United Kingdom, a significant
proportion of general practitioners’ pay became tied to a
quality and outcomes framework [68]. The behavioral
principles described here may also be applicable to incen-
tive design on the provider side and have the potential to
alleviate some of the problems identified with current pro-
grams [67]. Pay-for-performance (P4P) where providers
receive financial incentives to carry out specific care or
improve clinical outcomes (i.e., performance targets at
which the incentive is targeted) has been widely imple-
mented. There is emerging important evidence on P4P,
which reveals a mixed picture so far. Studies in both
United States [69] and United Kingdom [70] have found
that initially positive effects were short lived. In diabetes
care for example, the existing literature indicates P4P in-
centives stimulate initial gains that later tend to level off,
while withdrawing the incentives partially reverts the gains
[8]. We believe that behavioral re-design of some of those
P4P programs is very likely to improve their effectiveness.
Finally, behavioral economics also provides some argu-
ments against using incentives in specific circumstances.
Some economists claim that offering monetary incen-
tives may lead to destroying (‘crowding-out’) genuine
(‘intrinsic’) motivation [55]. There is some evidence from
a meta-analysis of experimental studies, which revealed
that after a behavior is associated with an external reward,
people are less willing to enact the behavior without fur-
ther external rewards; in other words, extrinsic rewards
undermined motivation [71]. So, when designing behavior
change interventions, we must consider that badly de-
signed policies can exacerbate the challenges we currently
face and lead to unintended consequences, such as when
financial incentives crowd-out/suppress intrinsic motiv-
ation for healthy behaviors [72, 73].
Future directions
This is a debate article, so the presentation of the data is
fundamentally descriptive and qualitative, because we do
no aim to synthesize the evidence. Rather, we offer a
theoretical investigation of incentive design and behavior
change. Incentives and behavior change perhaps present
the best examples of where genuine attempts have been
made to span the divide between behavioral science and
health policy, because incentives is the ‘tool’ most often
used by the policy makers to influence behavior. How-
ever, despite the recent flurry of scientific theories and
reports, there are not enough examples of successful
transition from science to policy. This article aims to
demonstrate that the evidence now exists where the
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‘behavior incentive design’ can stimulate intervention pro-
jects informed by a scientific understanding of behavior.
This approach is useful in social sciences but is lim-
ited. For example, nudges or economic interventions
that show strong effect on the collective behavior of
populations are put at the same level with others that
show only a tiny, and probably statistically insignificant,
trend. At present, we do not have a complete enough
picture of which configuration of incentives works best.
So, it is worth pinpointing areas which need more re-
search and areas where plenty of robust studies support
a given recommendation.
After reviewing the mounting evidence on the uncer-
tain effect of financial incentives to improve health be-
haviors, Thirumurthy, Asch and Volpp [74] conclude
that the principle that individuals respond to incentives
has considerable empirical support, but the devil is in
the detail, because the magnitude of effects differs sub-
stantially based on the nature of the behavior, the size of
the incentive, the population involved, the social context,
and the design (subtle design choices in how incentives
are situated, framed, or deployed can have substantial ef-
fects on their success). Therefore, investigating different
ways of joining up some of the psychological mecha-
nisms of action – loss aversion, hyperbolic discounting,
and increasing payoffs – may lead to real improvements
in the efficiency and effectiveness of existing and novel
incentive designs. Incentives based on combinations of
individual and group goals have also shown promising re-
sults. Furthermore, a potentially powerful approach is
combining both patient and provider incentives, but
whether this is cost-effective has yet to be determined [8].
Further insights from the behavioral sciences could
allow us to combine incentive schemes with other policy
tools to ensure long term effectiveness. One example are
commitment devices [15], which involves individuals
making a public decision about the future that results in
some additional (social and/or financial) cost if they fail
to follow through with that decision (or additional bene-
fit if they successfully do so). As many people revert to
past behaviors once the incentive is withdrawn, combin-
ing commitment devices with incentives may be useful
in ensuring long-term behavior change. There is limited
evidence from a Cochrane review that commitment con-
tracts can potentially contribute to improving adherence
to diagnostic procedures, therapeutic regimens or health
promotion and illness prevention initiatives [75].
The only real way to test further interventions of this
‘joined-up’ kind is through the proper design and use of
field experiments [76]. We would encourage those
designing incentive schemes to consider how some of
the lessons learnt from smaller scale and more experi-
mental studies can be examined in a more naturalistic
setting, thereby avoiding randomisation bias. Rigorous
evaluation and dissemination of the outcomes from
current and future schemes is also necessary to add to
the limited evidence that tells us what does and does not
work when using incentives. The ultimate criterion by
which to judge the merit of such interventions is
whether they improve the health and well-being of the
individual; and the more is the latter, the merrier is the
incentive scheme [77, 78].
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